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Chapter 9
From Interdependence to 
Vulnerability: EU-Russia 
Relations in Finance  
András Deák 
Since 2014 Western sanctions have been primarily designed to exert 
influence through the Russian financial system. On the microeco-
nomic level, measures were taken to freeze the Western assets of Rus-
sian senior decision-makers and entities. On the macroeconomic 
level, a wide variety of restrictions were imposed, most of them as a 
response to the escalating conflict in eastern Ukraine: the EU limited 
trade in certain financial instruments with a maturity longer than 90 
days; the US introduced various transactional bans on major Rus-
sian companies, such as Rosneft, Novatek and Gazprombank. Espe-
cially in these latter cases, the underlying expectation was to reduce 
the liquidity of Russian economic actors, hamper their investment 
potential and consequently constrain Moscow’s economic potential 
in the short and medium run. On the macroeconomic level, strin-
gency was meant to affect a wide range of sectors indirectly and pro-
portionally, while financial sanctions on individuals caused targeted 
pain for decision-makers.
The objective of this chapter is to summarise and briefly analyse the 
transformation process of Moscow’s financial interdependence with 
the West and the EU, and in particular Russia’s vulnerability. At the 
level of investments and financial and payments systems there was a 
much larger development cleavage in 2014 than in EU-Russia trade or 
energy relations. For the West and especially for the EU, this was the 
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first time that economic statecraft had been used as the central ele-
ment of its policy towards Russia. For Russia, integration into global 
value chains became a persistent threat to its sovereignty, forcing it 
to securitise new segments of its economy and develop new forms of 
resilience. Consequently, previous cooperation and interdependence 
moved into a new context, changing their patterns considerably.
In the first part I look briefly at the 2014 sanctions in the context of 
financial systems and highlight the differences between the EU and 
US approaches. This part also maps out the potential limits of sanc-
tions policy, if inconsistencies within transatlantic relations remain, 
implicitly demonstrating the EU’s significance in Western sanctions 
policy. In the two subsequent sections I look at two issues. First, I 
analyse the implications for Russia of the existing Western sanc-
tions, especially regarding the capital account, FDI and Russia’s net 
financing position. Second, I make a short presentation on Moscow’s 
policies, notably its efforts to increase the resilience of its payments 
system, which represent its most tangible reaction to the new reality. 
Increasing sovereignty over payments systems is also about lessen-
ing the consequences of a potential new round of Western sanctions, 
thus systematically and implicitly broadening future Russian for-
eign-policy options. In both of these issues I focus on the momentum 
of change, comparing the situation before and after 2014s and point-
ing to potential further trajectories. Finally, the concluding section 
briefly explores prospects for the future.
Power Relations of Western Sanctions
Before exploring the shifts in EU-Russia interdependence, it is impor-
tant to look at the power relations of the Western sanctions policy. 
Due to the key importance of the US in this issue, it is necessary to 
briefly compare the EU’s sanctions with those of the US. The Western 
sanctions against Russia constitute an extremely diverse set, in terms 
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of both subjects and targeted fields. The EU and the US, the two lead-
ing entities of Western sanctions policy (in total, 37 countries have 
imposed sanctions on Russia), coordinated their measures, especially 
in the early years, in order to optimise their impact. Despite these 
efforts, US and EU sanctions policies differ considerably.
First, the US has a long record of and considerable capability to 
impose and implement sanctions. In the 20th century, on 109 occa-
sions out of 174 documented cases it was the US that deployed sanc-
tions, while the EU used this instrument only 14 times.1 Washington 
has developed capabilities to monitor subjects, follow their actions 
and enforce its claims. The internal legal procedure has crystallised, 
and tactical issues are managed with high proficiency and efficiency. 
The EU has also intensified its sanctions policy in the last 20 years. At 
the same time, its policy still relies heavily on the 28 member states 
in both the decision-making process and implementation. Unlike the 
US, where the lifting of current measures often requires a long and 
laborious process in Congress, the European Council must renew 
even the existing set of sanctions each year. Enforcement depends 
on national authorities and this sometimes offers major loopholes for 
targeted subjects. 
Second, US sanctions are often enforceable beyond its national bor-
ders, even in cases in which the banned transaction takes place 
between two non-US subjects. This is especially true for sanctions 
related to the global financial system. Given the US role in global 
banking and the US dollar’s role in global finance, almost all major 
entities have US affiliations. Thus, Washington can compel even 
banks and countries that do not formally accept US financial sanc-
tions to impose them on Russia or at least to consider the US legal 
threat on their transactions.2 In this way, Washington can constrain 
Russian financial cooperation even with Chinese or other Far Eastern 
1 Hufbauer et al., 2009, pp. 3–5.
2 Société Générale, 2018.
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subjects.3 This is a major advantage, enlarging the scope of its actions 
and making the EU’s measures appear rather weak.
Third, the objectives of US sanctions go well beyond the Ukraine 
conflict. While the EU pursues an issue-based approach, Washing-
ton formulated a diverse set of goals related to cybersecurity, human 
rights, Russian action in Syria and Russian energy policy.4 US sanc-
tions against Russia have become normative and a continuous pro-
cess, with little hope for Moscow of changing them substantially. 
This is in sharp contrast to EU-Russia relations, in which Russia may 
anticipate a status quo attitude unless Moscow changes its own pol-
icy. It may even try to water down the current set of sanctions, espe-
cially if it can shift the Western perception of its actions in eastern 
Ukraine or reach significant compromise on the issue.
Given these features, it is reasonable to say that the US leads on West-
ern sanctions policy. US measures have a broader scope and provide 
certainty that current sanctions will be present for a long time and also 
uncertainty about what comes next. The latter is pivotal for any effec-
tive sanctions policy. The notion of worsening relations and future 
actions handicaps longer-term patterns of cooperation, increases 
country and corporate risks, and makes external financing consider-
ably more expensive for banks and financial institutions. The EU’s par-
ticipation was important at the start and still provides a good deal of 
weight and international credibility. At the same time, its measures are 
too stagnant with little potential for change, enabling targeted subjects 
to adapt to them. EU decision-making obviously suffers shortcomings 
stemming from its intergovernmental nature. Unlike the US, Euro-
pean companies are also much more affected by Russia’s economic dif-
ficulties, significantly constraining the EU’s scope for action.
3 A good demonstration of this was the arrest of Huawei’s chief financial officer in Canada in 
December 2018 and her potential extradiction to the US because of the alleged violation of 
US sanctions against Iran.
4 Liik, 2019b.
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When looking at EU-Russia interdependence at the level of financial 
systems, these characteristics must be taken into account. Despite all 
the damage to political and public trust caused by Russia’s actions 
against Ukraine, EU sanctions against Russia remain reversible. How-
ever, much of the damage to EU-Russia ties stems from US sanctions on 
their own. The potential implications of an EU “sanctions thaw” may 
be limited if US sanctions remain in force. Nonetheless, the political-
economic context of sanctions has been changing. Given the extensive 
use of sanctions policy by the Trump administration and international 
discontent over dismantling certain multilateral institutions (e.g. the 
WTO dispute settlement process), even the EU may distance itself 
from the US. Washington has to some extent discredited its leading 
role in the global economy, putting the creation of alternative systems 
on the agenda in many countries.5 Russia’s attempts to regain auton-
omy over its own payments systems and strengthen financial resilience 
are therefore to some extent in line with the economic zeitgeist.
How the Sanctions Work
 
Shrinking turnover between the EU and Russia
The impact of sanctions on Russia’s economy was magnified by two 
major factors: a fall in oil prices from the summer of 2014 and a gen-
eral slowdown in GDP growth caused by structural problems since 
2012. Russia went into recession after 2014 and has been recovering 
sluggishly since 2016. All these signs could be interpreted as symp-
toms of major growth problems. At the same time, it is impossible 
to measure to what extent this is due to Western sanctions. Some 
assumptions regarding the long-term macroeconomic effects can be 
drawn by approaching this issue from the balance of payments angle, 
analysing its interaction with other countries.
5 For example, even senior German politicians support the idea of creating a “European 
SWIFT”, given the alleged US bias in the current system.
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Being a major energy exporter, Russia traditionally has a huge for-
eign trade surplus (180.6 billion USD and 115.4 bn USD in 2013 and 
2017 respectively).6 Exports constitute by far the biggest line in the 
current account balance (521.8 bn USD and 353.6 bn USD) and have 
been only negligibly affected by the sanctions; the measures directly 
targeting the energy sector are very limited and their effects can be 
felt only in the longer run. On the imports side, sanctions may have 
triggered some indirect effects. Western sanctions influenced the 
rouble’s exchange rate, and the political threat may also force Mos-
cow to restrict imports for a variety of reasons. Nonetheless, falling 
oil prices have caused steady depreciations of the rouble in the past, 
especially in 1998 and 2008–9. It is therefore reasonable to say that a 
foreign trade surplus is a systematic feature of the contemporary Rus-
sian reality and gives a good deal of robustness to its finances. 
Other lines in the current account have traditionally been negative 
and reduce the surplus. These items have presumably been affected 
to a greater extent by Western sanctions. Among others, they include 
foreign exchange in services (−58.3 bn USD and −31.1 bn USD in 
2013 and 2017 respectively), compensation of employees (−13.2 bn 
USD and −2.3 bn USD) and investment income (−66.5 bn USD and 
−39.8 bn USD). The latter line in particular is increasingly sensitive to 
expectations about the future. Nevertheless, Russia’s current account 
balance remained positive (1.4% and 2.2% of GDP in 2013 and 2017 
respectively) and it would be difficult to characterise these develop-
ments as unique or out of the ordinary.
The emerging perception of Russia’s financial vulnerability is more 
visible in the capital account. This shows the net lender–borrower 
position of a country, including direct investments, loans and bal-
ances of other transfers between domestic and foreign subjects. This 
turnover has dropped substantially, the annual growth of liabilities 
6 Data in this chapter come from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CBR) unless oth-
erwise stated.
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decreasing from 124.4 bn USD to 1.3 bn USD between 2013 and 2017.7 
Given the similar trajectory of Russia’s external assets, this signals a 
major drop in financial interaction between Russia and the rest of the 
world. While Russia remained a net lender to the rest of the world, 
capital transactions fell to a qualitatively new level. On the one hand, 
Russian subjects refrained from capital transfers abroad, where the 
threat of existing and future sanctions may have played a significant 
role. On the other, Russian residents also stopped receiving capital 
transfers from abroad. Besides FDI, this also affects the level of foreign 
debt, which decreased from 715.9 bn USD to 470.2 bn USD between 
January 2014 and October 2018. This latter indicator is a major change 
in the trend and is certainly an effect of the sanctions, and signals an 
inability and to some extent unwillingness to borrow from abroad.
The reduction in gross capital transfers only implies a more “closed” 
status of the economy and does not ultimately affect economic per-
formance. Nonetheless, it may cause major turbulence even in the 
short run if other lines of the current account balance change unfa-
vourably. Thus, positive balance in Russian exports and especially 
international oil and gas prices may have an even greater significance 
today than in the past. In order to improve the short- and medium-
term effectiveness of sanctions, a major reduction in export reve-
nues would have been not only desirable but essential. This happened 
only partially, due to market forces (the average export price of Rus-
sian Urals oil fell from 106.9 USD to 40.3 USD/barrel between 2013 
and 2016). Limiting foreign trade and especially putting a direct or 
indirect embargo on Russian energy has not been among the West’s 
policy options. Restricting the capital account was the maximum 
affordable at the current level of the dispute. 
Nonetheless, in the longer run the low principal of the capital account 
may turn out to be expensive in the macroeconomic sense. High levels 
7 In 2015 this figure was −72.9 bn USD, against a 4.0 bn USD decrease in Russia’s foreign assets.
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of FDI represent not only financial but also technological and know-
how transfer for the recipient economy. The lack of these may slow 
down technological progress, especially if not compensated for by 
other, domestic efforts. A lack of external finance may have worrying 
consequences, given the capital-poor nature of the Russian economy 
and the capital-intensive energy sectors. Major Russian companies 
cannot raise the funds needed for their development projects from 
domestic sources, and can therefore only get foreign credits at higher 
interest rates or less favourable terms. 
The end of the decade of Russian iFDI?
In formal terms, investments are not inherently a part of finance. 
Nonetheless, high levels of inward foreign direct investment (iFDI) 
often symbolise the ultimate form of economic trust between sub-
jects and are very sensitive to any disruptions in relations. It should 
therefore be no surprise that annual flows of iFDI to Russia fell by 
more than 90% between 2013 and 2015.8 This fall by far exceeded the 
drop in any other category, such as foreign trade, outward foreign 
direct investment (oFDI) from Russia, and remittances. This collapse 
also affected EU-Russia relations, since the Union had a unique role 
among foreign investors: at its peak, the EU’s share of total iFDI in 
Russia was over 80%. This is a very high proportion, even if invest-
ment flows from Russian-owned foreign residences (e.g. round-trip-
ping and transhipping) represent a major bias in interpretation.
In a post-communist new EU member country, such a gap in FDI flows 
would have caused severe recession and, probably, political turbulence. 
But for Russia, iFDI and multinational companies have never become 
such important strategic constituencies as in most EU member states. 
According to UNCTAD, until the mid-2000s Russian iFDI stock levels 
8 From 69.2 bn USD in 2013 to 6.8 bn USD in 2015. For comparison, iFDI flows decreased to a 
much more humble level during the financial crisis, from 74.8 bn USD in 2008 to 36.6 bn USD 
in 2009.
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remained below those of the combined Visegrád Four countries, even 
in absolute terms.9 Thus, expansion of foreign investments started rela-
tively late, in the mid-2000s, and lasted only for a decade. The reasons 
are manifold. Besides the long and turbulent transformation under 
Yeltsin and late consolidation in the early Putin years, Russian FDI 
receptivity always remained relatively low. According to the OECD’s 
FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index, the Russian indicator exceeded 
the OECD average by a factor of almost three (0.182 vs 0.066).10 
Furthermore, foreign multinationals were driven into Russia by dif-
ferent motivations than they were in Central and Eastern Europe. In 
the new EU member countries efficiency-seeking and access to the 
region’s cheap and educated labour force for manufacturing indus-
tries was the major incentive. At the same time, in the case of Russia, 
market- and resource-seeking  motivations played a dominant role. 
Having the 9th-biggest population in the world and being 48th on a 
per capita GDP PPP basis,11 Russian aggregate demand is comparable 
with all former communist Eastern European countries combined. 
Foreign multinationals understandably tried to access this market 
and, given its economies of scale, they were also ready to bring in 
production capacity to supply local demand. Thus, European iFDI in 
sectors such as car assembly, pharmaceuticals and the food industry 
targeted not export markets so much as Russian consumers. Simi-
larly, access to huge and often cheap resources in sectors like energy, 
mining, forestry and agriculture has remained a major objective, 
despite local policy constraints.
However, these investment motivations are increasingly sensitive 
to growth and political considerations. For solid market-seeking 
9 The average per capita iFDI of Russia and the combined V4 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia) between 2005 and 2009 remained at 2,057 USD and 5,659 USD respectively 
(author’s calculations based on UNCTAD FDI data).
10 OECD, 2017.
11 Author’s ranking based on data from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database 2018. IMF, 
2017.
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investments, the prospect of long-term sustainable growth in aggre-
gate demand is crucial. These prospects were taken for granted in the 
past, since Putin’s legitimacy rested partly on spectacular growth in 
welfare and social stability. On this basis, politics was to some extent 
overlooked as a potential threat to local business. The annexation of 
Crimea and the subsequent Western sanctions constituted a major 
watershed in this respect, driving Russia into recession and putting 
political risks into the spotlight of business activity. Similarly, Russia’s 
move towards import-substitution, reliance on local resources and a 
large number of new restrictions further constrain resource-seeking 
investments. This latter feature has been present since the mid-2000s, 
but since 2014 related country risks have deteriorated considerably.12 
However, Russian iFDI levels are historically closely interrelated with 
the respective flows of oFDI. This has long been a distinctive feature of 
Russia among the BRIC countries. Capital exports and outflow were 
increasingly motivated by local push factors, the low level of financial 
services and institutional uncertainties within Russia. A good deal of 
these funds returns to Russia through foreign residency: in 2017 the 
top three investor countries in Russia were Cyprus, the Bahamas and 
Luxembourg, with a combined share of 64% of total iFDI. Western 
sanctions may considerably encumber these round-tripping and cir-
culation activities. Under most sanctions regimes, foreign banks and 
financial entities must examine every suspicious transfer on the basis 
of ultimate beneficiary ownership. This is a complicated administra-
tive process with a high probability of failure, especially if the client 
is related to the extensive web of sanctioned individuals or entities. 
Under the US sanctions, even financial transactions with some major 
Russian companies may hold certain risk. 
12 Traditionally the law on strategic industries (Federal Law No. 57-FZ of April 2008) is taken 
as the formal start of cutting the list of sectors accessible to foreign investors (Russian Fed-
eration, 2008). However, informal political support had been essential for major deals even 
before that, as the failed purchase of Yukos or the Sakhalin concessions demonstrated.
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It should therefore come as no surprise that many European banks 
refrained from major financial transactions with any Russian sub-
jects, especially in the early years of sanctions, and those that ran the 
risk did so probably at fees higher than normal. Understandably, reg-
ulations and practices vary widely between countries and banking 
institutions. Nonetheless, multiple transfers of funds, often required 
to hide traces of the client from Western and/or Russian governments, 
carry exponential risks and costs, restricting the scale of applicabil-
ity. Unlike simple capital flows, round-tripping usually requires pre-
cisely these multiple transactions. Consequently, oFDI from Russia 
fell from 86.5 bn USD to 36.8 bn USD between 2013 and 2017. 
Despite all these negative trends in FDI, there is hardly any indica-
tion of a change in the geography of investments. In 2016 Singapore 
became the largest foreign investor in Russia, but this was due to a 
single megadeal; Singapore’s 3.7% of total iFDI stock is no match for 
Cyprus’ share of 36.7%.13 It would also be misleading to speak of a 
major investment gap in Russia. Capital investment fell from 23.1% of 
GDP to 21.9% between 2013 and 2015 but later recovered. The reduc-
tion in iFDI was probably offset to some extent by domestic investment, 
boosted by depreciation of the rouble. All these indicators suggest a 
degree of reversal of the trends since 2014. The major question, there-
fore, is whether the FDI gap is a temporary setback or represents a new 
form of economic model that relies predominantly on internal capital 
accumulation and successfully constrains round-tripping.
How Russia Has Adapted to Sanctions
Budgetary tightening and credit deleveraging
The conventional European expectation was that sanctions would 
restrict Moscow’s financial capabilities, cause social and elite discontent 
13 CBR, n.d., table “Pryamiye investitsii v Rossiyskuyu Federatsiyu - 2018”.
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and thus force Russia to choose the lesser of two evils and make con-
cessions in the conflict over Ukraine. While it remains unclear to what 
extent economic coercion is convertible into foreign policy, the scope of 
the financial tightening is worth analysing. 
The Soviet Union and Russia faced several external economic shocks 
in the last 30 years. Falling oil prices combined with domestic weak-
nesses caused severe financial problems in 1986, 1998 and to a 
lesser extent 2008–9. This is to some extent normal, given Russia’s 
sharply increasing reliance on revenue from energy exports since 
the late Soviet period and liberalisation of its foreign economic rela-
tions after 1991.14 Moscow failed to manage this trend of interdepen-
dence with global markets until the late 1990s. The incoming Putin 
administration did not change direction towards integration with 
the world economy, but set measures to manage future vulnerabil-
ities and increase Russian financial self-rule. On the public finance 
level, Russia repaid much of its debt to foreign creditors and the IMF 
by 2003. It also set up an anti-cycle mechanism in its 2004 budget to 
collect excess rent income from oil and gas exports (the Stabilisation 
Fund) and splitting it between two quasi-sovereign wealth funds (the 
Reserve Fund and the National Welfare Fund) in 2008. The combined 
value of these funds equated to around 8% of GDP in early 2014.
Western sanctions did not affect public finances directly.15 Sanc-
tions may have aggravated economic hardship in Russia and vastly 
increased the risks of taking large-scale credits in foreign markets. 
Both these developments currently have little relevance, although 
14 In 1985, 14.7% of total Soviet hydrocarbon production (1.536 billion toe) was exported. In 
2010 the respective figure for Russia was 47.1% (of 1.279 billion toe). Author’s own calcula-
tions, based on Gustafson, 1989 and IEA “Country statistics”.
15 In early 2018, the US Department of the Treasury considered the usefulness of extending 
sanctions to Russian sovereign debt, but these measures would also have caused damage 
to US subjects and their effects seemed to be considerably less harmful without EU involve-
ment. Timofeev, 2018, p. 24.
174 175
From Interdependence to Vulnerability: EU-Russia Relations in Finance
they may narrow Moscow’s economic options in particular future 
situations. One of the factors deserving of attention is the depletion 
of Russian budgetary reserves. The roughly 90 bn USD in the Reserve 
Fund had been fully spent by early 2018,16 by which time the gov-
ernment had started taking assets from the National Welfare Fund. 
Given that a good deal of the latter’s resources was in illiquid form and 
invested in Russian projects, the total accessible funds approached a 
record low (2% of GDP). While this can be considered a normal anti-
cycle policy, the threat of potentially low oil prices remains valid and 
forces the Kremlin to keep a tight hold of the budget. The second fac-
tor is global monetary tightening and rising interest rates, and their 
implications for emerging and commodity markets. This may fur-
ther restrict Russian public and corporate borrowing, and lessens 
the chances for Russia to manage economic problems through grow-
ing indebtedness. Without fiscal buffers, Moscow can only balance 
public spending by cutting expenditure or raising taxes. Not sur-
prisingly, it could not maintain the previous high levels of defence 
spending beyond 2017, and general government revenue in terms of 
GDP is expected to reach a new post-2009 high (35.5%). Cutting mili-
tary spending and causing tight fiscal balances are among the stated 
objectives of Western sanctions policy.
The reserves of the Russian Central Bank (CBR) are of a different 
magnitude. In early 2014 they stood at 500 bn USD, more than one-
fifth of Russia’s GDP.17 Unlike the budgetary reserves, the government 
makes efforts to preserve the CBR’s funds as the country’s main finan-
cial buffer. While it functions as a conventional monetary instrument, 
the CBR traditionally refrains from excessive interventions and allows 
the rouble to depreciate relatively early in crisis situations. This is in 
sharp contrast with the 1998 Russian crisis or the monetary policies of 
many other oil exporters. While this practice leads to the preservation 
16 Inozemtsev, 2018a.
17 For comparison, at the time of Putin’s inauguration in May 2000, the CBR’s reserves were 
below 18 bn USD.
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of CBR funds, it represents a major exchange rate risk for other eco-
nomic subjects. The exchange rate with the euro fluctuated intensively 
– between 46 and 90 roubles – in the first two years of the Ukraine 
conflict, causing serious losses for unprotected companies.
Exchange rate volatility polarises the corporate sector’s relationship 
with credit markets. Exporting industries, mainly from the mining 
sector, collect their revenues mostly in foreign currency and have 
high capital investment and borrowing requirements. For national 
flagship companies like Gazprom, Rosneft and Lukoil, the domes-
tic credit markets are too shallow, so their search for foreign credit 
opportunities is natural. The Putin era brought a normative approxi-
mation in this respect, as Russian corporate actors introduced West-
ern auditing, reporting and other standards in order to tap foreign 
financial markets. Other, usually smaller, firms and households 
receiving their revenues in roubles remained more dependent on 
national credit markets. The CBR and the government maintained 
a cautious approach to foreign-currency-nominated lending prior to 
2014. Total Russian debt increased from 213.3 bn USD to 728.9 bn 
USD between 2005 and 2014, around 75% of it nominated in foreign 
currencies. By international standards, this level represents a low 
exposure, especially given the CBR’s vast reserves. 
The Western sanctions brought a turnaround even from this rela-
tively low level. As mentioned earlier, Russia’s foreign debt in absolute 
terms has decreased by 35% since January 2014. The fall was partic-
ularly steep in the first two years, when major Russian companies 
and banks withdrew from international credit markets: e.g. Gazprom 
did not issue eurobonds between February 2014 and November 2016 
(between 2011 and 2013 it issued eight tranches of them). This dele-
veraging process can certainly be attributed to the sanctions. At the 
time of global quantitative easing and low interest rates, when cheap 
credits were particularly popular in emerging markets, deleveraging 
was somewhat exceptional. Since then, despite the return of many 
176 177
From Interdependence to Vulnerability: EU-Russia Relations in Finance
Russian corporate entities to the credit markets and the lack of visi-
ble premium on interests, borrowing has remained very cautious and 
moderate deleveraging has continued.
Russian companies have also turned towards Far Eastern finan-
cial markets. Besides corporate risks in relation to the West, this 
move has also been underpinned by the gradually shifting geogra-
phy of Russian exports and infrastructure. The first time major Chi-
nese financial support was accepted by Russia was for the purchase 
of Yuganskneftegaz by Rosneft in 2005, an action which would have 
posed a huge legal risk for any Western entity. Since then these credit 
relationships have become widely used and since 2014 a new set of 
companies has joined the race for Chinese and Far Eastern connec-
tions. Sberbank started to lend in yuan, VTB and Bank of China set 
up new product lines servicing trade contracts, and Gazprom issued 
bonds for Asian lenders. Novatek went even further, by giving a 
major (29.9%) stake of its Yamal LNG project to Chinese investors. 
Russia and China are also attempting to switch from the US dollar 
to the yuan and rouble in bilateral trade.18 Nonetheless, these shifts 
must be made with care: Chinese lending conditions are sometimes 
harsher than those from the EU, and Asian financial markets often 
lack liquidity and are in some respects underdeveloped. While these 
trends are natural in light of the shifting geography of the Russian 
economy, a rapid and full reorientation seems unlikely.
Establishing self-rule over the Russian payments system
While current Western sanctions only partly affected the payments 
system, in the last four years Russia has securitised this issue and 
set up a sovereign infrastructure. Many other countries developed 
some elements of their payments system in a similar way in the 
18 Only 18–19% of bilateral trade was conducted in roubles or yuan in 2017. This represents a 
fourfold increase compared to 2013, but further progress could be difficult (Dolgin, 2018).
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past. Nonetheless, the Russian move seems unique, inasmuch as it 
is driven by security considerations and is aimed at increasing resil-
ience in case of a further deterioration in foreign relations.
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Russian payments system 
developed in a liberalised manner. Emerging financial institutions joined 
the global, mostly Western, infrastructure without having an alterna-
tive or national strategy in this respect. The Russian payments system 
has been built up following business inertia, and domestic efforts were 
driven by emerging requirements from the corporate side. The 2008–9 
financial crisis brought considerable shifts in this attitude. The crisis 
created a good deal of turbulence in the global financial and payments 
system, some of which could have been avoided, or at least reduced, by 
having some elements of payments infrastructure in national hands. 
These cases were related to stalling interbank markets and problems 
with payment cards. Consequently, the Russian government put a num-
ber of measures in place to increase resilience and laid the foundation of 
Russia’s own payments system. In 2010 it decided to establish a national 
payments system servicing state entities and municipalities within the 
national border (without the involvement of non-Russian subjects). In 
2011 a national bank card system (Universal Electronic Cards, or UEC) 
and the related infrastructure (PRO100) were created, offering an alter-
native to other systems, such as Visa and Mastercard.19  
These measures offered a humble alternative to existing payments 
practices. The number of entities using and accepting these chan-
nels and cards remained limited. UEC was accepted only by 250,000 
trading units, even including some major Russian banks. Further-
more, the service remained relatively expensive and slow, was acces-
sible only within national borders, and issues over coordination with 
other providers remained unregulated. The policy objective, clearly, 
was rather to create an alternative with limited scope and effects for 
19 Arzumanova, 2017.
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certain purposes, and not a substitute for the dominant forms of pay-
ments through international providers. The “Strategy on develop-
ment of a national payment system” accepted by the CBR on March 
2013 was prepared in this hybrid spirit.20  
The strategy has changed with the introduction of Western sanc-
tions. In the new situation, Western – especially US – authorities can 
even request data from international providers on the domestic finan-
cial transactions of sanctioned Russian individuals and entities. Fur-
thermore, in March 2014 Mastercard and Visa stopped servicing some 
Russian banks, citing US sanctions, leaving 220,000 Russian citizens 
without access to their bank cards.21 The extension of the sanctions 
became a realistic option, and discussions even began on disconnecting 
Russia from SWIFT. This latter potential step could almost completely 
paralyse economic cooperation with Russia, including trade in energy, 
causing severe disruption not only for Moscow but for all capitals having 
trade relations with it. Consequently, the Russian government decided 
to establish a new national payments system with the capability to sub-
stitute international payment providers as much as possible.
Under the new system, all domestic financial institutions are obliged 
to open accounts at the CBR, through which their transactions 
within Russia are serviced; all information is classified and it is for-
bidden to provide data to any outsiders. At the same time, all domes-
tic payments by any bank cards, including Visa and Mastercard, are 
serviced within Russia through the National Payment Card System. 
Russia also created its own bank card payment provider, a system 
known as MIR. By October 2018, 45 million cards had been issued, a 
17% market share.22 MIR is accepted by all major Russian banks and 
companies. Several measures have been taken to secure accessibil-
ity of MIR cards abroad at reasonable cost. Cooperation with other 
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid, p. 133.
22 National Payment Card System, 2018.
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international providers, such as Mastercard, Visa and China Union-
Pay, has been arranged through partnership programmes since 2016, 
while Russian banks also offer co-badging cards (e.g. MIR-Maestro). 
The latter function as MIR cards within Russia and in line with the 
standards of the co-badging partner abroad. However, the policy 
objective is to get recognition abroad for MIR in its own right, and 
this has been achieved in some EAEU countries (Belarus, Armenia), 
and potentially, in the foreseeable future, even beyond (e.g. Turkey).23 
While the Russian authorities understandably prioritise the new 
national payments system, it still has some shortcomings. It applies 
higher fees than its competitors, and affiliated services such as a 
clearing solution have only recently been established. Nonetheless, 
past examples show that national payments systems have relevance 
and can play an important role at national or even international level. 
Japan established its JCB International in 1981, and now has around 
111 million credit card users worldwide. China introduced Union-
Pay in 2002 and India has had RuPay since 2012. As far as national 
bank cards are concerned, even European countries apply different 
schemes, such as Carte Bleue in France, the Girocard debit card sys-
tem in Germany and Bancomat in Italy. MIR and related payments 
systems could certainly evolve as a major stakeholder in Russia and 
in some neighbouring countries.
At the same time, even these new systems hide vulnerabilities. Trans-
actions, especially with European or US entities, remain “visible” and 
detachable through the accounts of both the respective banks and 
Western financial providers. The likelihood of Western banks join-
ing MIR in the foreseeable future remains low. Furthermore, the 
SWIFT system, providing technical support for global transactions, 
remains a major source of vulnerability for the whole payments sys-
tem. Even if SWIFT is legally a Belgian company, it is widely alleged 
23 National Payment Card System, n.d.
180 181
From Interdependence to Vulnerability: EU-Russia Relations in Finance
that the US authorities can access its systems and even block trans-
actions in US dollars. On these grounds, senior European stakehold-
ers such as Federica Mogherini, the EU’s High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the German foreign min-
ister, Heiko Maas, have expressed their wish to establish the “EU’s 
own SWIFT” to achieve independence from the US.24 Accordingly, 
Russian stakeholders strive for de-dollarisation of their transactions 
(e.g. Gazprom has reportedly switched from US dollars to euros in 
many of its European export contracts) and actively advertise their 
readiness to establish an alternative to SWIFT. Countries potentially 
affected by Western sanctions, especially Iran and Turkey, but even 
China, may also be interested in this. Nonetheless, given the sensitive 
nature of this information and its significance in global financial gov-
ernance, no easy progress is to be expected.
Conclusion
Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia had been integrating 
into the global financial system, established and developed in the West-
ern hemisphere after World War II. This system has been historically 
dominated by the leading role of the US and its currency. Nonetheless, 
due to its extensive trade, human and political relations with European 
countries, the EU also won a major role in Russian investment, bank-
ing and credit. The Western sanctions introduced since 2014 represent 
an important turning point in this respect. Representatives of Euro-
pean and Russian business can no longer ignore political components: 
these risks must be included in corporate strategies. While this process 
is not irreversible, in terms of mutual investment the period of rap-
prochement is over and it may take a long time to rebuild trust.
24 Maas, 2018.
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The effects of political disputes and sanctions will be magnified by a 
number of underlying structural trends. Russia has been distancing 
itself from the EU in terms of foreign trade for more than a decade. In 
2005, the EU and APEC respectively accounted for 52.0% and 16.2% 
of Russia’s foreign turnover, while in 2017 these indicators were 42.8% 
and 29.9% respectively. Given planned and ongoing energy projects, it 
is reasonable to expect near parity proportions between the two eco-
nomic blocs in the foreseeable future. This happens more as a result 
of normal market gravity than on the basis of political assumptions, 
and indicates a major change in trade orientation. Protectionism and 
import substitution gained popularity long before 2014. Russia’s acces-
sion to the WTO in 2012 signalled a major, but clearly last, step in 
Russia’s post-1991 liberalisation. In many respects, protectionism pro-
vides opportunities for social and elite consolidation, even if poten-
tially at the cost of sacrifices in longer-term competitiveness. On this 
basis, regaining financial self-rule and emerging securitised mindsets 
around finances fit well into the new economic policy patterns.
European stakeholders can hardly reverse these trends. Most of 
them stem from not only political factors but also structural ones, 
and the EU’s own policies also point towards decreasing interdepen-
dence. The major question is how the sides can manage this process 
of mutual distancing. The West’s efforts to use its economic leverage 
for political purposes currently dominates the economic agenda. At 
the same time, Russia’s ambitions for strategic interference, includ-
ing disinformation campaigns, overshadow political relations. None-
theless, there is no visible longer-term alternative to the development 
of EU-Russia relations. The elaboration of a mutually acceptable plan 
for cooperation with reduced interdependence would be highly desir-
able. This could save some aspects of the relationship from the cur-
rent freefall and potentially provide more instruments to manage 
confrontational situations.
